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Chapter 1

Gale and Shapely asked, “Given a set of preferences among employers and applicants, can we assign applicants to employers so that for every employer E and every applicant A who is not scheduled to work for E, at least one of the following two things is the case?

  • E prefers everyone of its accepted applicants to A;
  • A prefers her current situation over working for employer E

If this holds, the outcome is stable - individual self-interest will prevent anything from changing. Interestingly, Gale and Shapely were not the first people to work on this algorithm. A decade earlier, there had been similar work dealing with matching residents to hospitals.

Formulating the Problem
courses/cs211/winter2014/journals/deirdre/chapter1.1389728780.txt.gz · Last modified: 2014/01/14 19:46 by tobind
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