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| courses:cs211:winter2018:journals:bairdc:chapter1 [2018/01/16 04:23] – [Chapter 1] bairdc | courses:cs211:winter2018:journals:bairdc:chapter1 [2018/01/16 06:19] (current) – [1.1 – A First Problem: Stable Matching] bairdc | ||
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| - | ====== Chapter 1 ====== | + | ====== Chapter 1 – Introduction: |
| - | // | + | |
| My notes on the assigned sections of Chapter 1 of Algorithm Design by Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos. | My notes on the assigned sections of Chapter 1 of Algorithm Design by Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos. | ||
| - | ===== 1.1 A First Problem: Stable Matching ===== | + | ===== 1.1 – A First Problem: Stable Matching ===== |
| + | This section details the stable matching problem. The motivation for this problem was originally to create a stable matching algorithm for a college admission process or a job recruiting process that was self-enforcing. The algorithm needs to avoid instabilities: | ||
| + | Basic Sketch of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable matching: | ||
| + | |||
| + | < | ||
| + | while some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman | ||
| + | Choose such a man m | ||
| + | w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed | ||
| + | if w is free | ||
| + | | ||
| + | else if w prefers m to her fiancé m' | ||
| + | | ||
| + | else | ||
| + | w rejects m | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | After reading the section, all the proofs make much more sense now. The only one that still is a little confusing to me is (1.8) that each woman in a stable matching is paired with her worst valid partner. It makes some sense, but I have to read over it a few times to make it make sense in my head. I'm sure it will make more sense over time. This section is a 8/10 in terms of readability and being interesting to me. | ||
